As I continue to read Colonel Oates' book titled the War between the Union and the Confederacy I become more impressed with his writing ability and endless collection of sources and information.
I feel a connection with him for he shares not only many of the same principals as I but also opinion of certain figures in Civil War history. For example, he comes down on Longstreet quite a few times. He used actual data to back his opinion up which is very admirable.
He also throws a harsh judgment toward Beauregard, Hardee, and Johnston. One of his grievances toward Johnston was that Johnston had promised to stay at Hood's side when the command was switched over. He was to fill in what needed Hood needed to learn of the situation as a commanding officer. Yet, Johnston had slighted Hood because of his malice toward a junior officer taking his place. Included in Oates' book are personal letters from Johnston confirming this wounded pride. Hardee also, until he withdrew from the Army of Tennessee refused to obey Hood's orders. He had written that he did not consider Hood a superior. One example was when Hardee did not, as ordered, attack the enemy's open flank at Jonesboro on the 22nd of August. He instead led a very sluggish and half hearted frontal attack that decided nothing.
This kind of personality plagued the Army of Tennessee from its earliest origins. Bragg, Polk, and Bunkner are a few others to have tainted the Confederate dream with their personalities. But, there were a few, in my opinion, from that army who were some of the Confederacy's most shining stars. Forrest, Cleburne, Wheeler, Morgan, and A.S. Johnston. And most shining of them all were the private soldiers from Georgia, Texas, Arkansas and Tennessee. It was not enough though. Throw in a few bad men against Union armies of no less than 60,000 troops led by superb officers.
Near Spring Hill later in 1864 Hood ordered General Cheatman to attack Schofield's exposed column. Yet, Cheatman cheated Hood. (pun intended).
Hood later wrote, "I could hardly believe it possible that this brave old solider, who had given proof of such courage and ability upon so many hard-fought fields, would ever make such a report...I would as soon have expected midday to turn into darkness as for him to have disobeyed my orders."
Hood being in command of the army, however, and with his wounds plaguing him so, made himself ripe for most of the blame for loosing Atlanta and not taking Nashville. I will not go as far as to say, though, that Hood did not deserve some blame for the disasters at Franklin and Nashville.
Johnston again proved himself to put personality before principal while with Beauregard in North Carolina in 1865. When the two met Jeff Davis at the close of the war, Davis asked them to stay the coarse as long as possible. Though imoblie at the time, they had the men.
However, being old enemies of the president, Beauregard and Johnston felt they had the perfect chance to slight Davis and win a battle against him. They moved toward total surrender and left Davis to be alone and on the run.
Colonel Oates wrote of these personalities that divided the Army of Tennessee and indeed most of the Confederacy. "Wounded pride-offended human nature-is stronger than love of country, for which men are willing to die, except in very rare instances. Of all the great Confederate generals, Albert Sidney Johnston and Robert E. Lee are perhaps the only two who possessed so much unselfish patriotism, Christian spirit, and nobleness of soul as to have endured wounded pride, offended dignity, and degradation of rank, and even then would not have neglected an opportunity to aid their stricken and bleed country."
personality before principal in the AOT
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Army of Tennessee
This is quite a long subject with a simple explanation that really is not as simple as one would believe.
No dis-respect intended to Gen. Oates but he has his own shortcomings and a history of mixed accounts of events as they happened, even at the Rocky Hill. Much of what he seems to have written by your account seems to be more personal opinion than factual. I deem it "personal" only because he had to have come by the information second hand, except in the time he was with Longstreet with the AOT.
What divided the AOT most was President Davis attempting to put pressure on that Army and it's commander to do the impossible. Bragg was not considered by many a superb General even at the time. The victory at Chickamauga was chance largely by the fate of Gen. Longstreet's corp striking the recently expose gap in the center of the Federal line and dividing it. This caused the mass panic and retreat. Gen. Longstreet most likely objected to the advance based on a similar tactics that failed at Gettysburg under Gen. Pickett.
When the senior Generals wrote their complaint on Bragg in October. President Davis (who was a close personal friend of Bragg) came out to Chattanooga. Here he either reassigned the Officer's elsewhere or dismissed them. Longstreet fared the best but lost two divisions that were reassigned elsewhere. Davis's actions more than any probably contributed to the Confederate defeat at Chattanooga, from the bulk of the experience senior officers not being present on the field. After the defeat and resignation of Bragg most of these officers were recalled back to the Army of Tennessee.
At this point, Oates nolonger had direct contact with the AOT because he left for Virginia with Longstreet that winter.
Gen. Hardee was initially given the command of the AOT but he refused citing that Gen. Johnston would be the better choice and so Gen. Johnston was brought in. Gen. Hardee remained in command until Johnston arrived. This is important to note because it gives us an idea of who was the next senior officer.
Johnston only had a shell of an Army in the winter of 63-64. Bragg had deprived the men of much needed equipment and rations. Johnston essential rebuilt the army back to regular strength which was a fate in itself. By Spring the Army was back in fighting spirit.
The problem with the campaign was that Gen. Johnston was fighting an advancing Army twice his size. The Federals were made up of three Armies; Army of the Tennessee, Army of the Cumberland and Army of the Ohio (later merged with the Cumberland) some 110,000 men against 65,000. Despite the lopsided numbers Johnston fought defensively inflicting a large number of causalities at each encounter. At several points there were opportunities to destroy a portion of the Federal Army. Some point those failures came due to General Hood's failure to attack in a timely fashion.
One of the Greatest mistakes made by President Davis was replacing Johnston...especially with Hood. Gen. Lee gave Pres.Davis two bits of advice. The first was not to replace Johnston on the eve of a battle, the second was to appoint Gen. Hardee instead of Hood if he had to replace Johnston. There are several accounts of the situation with Johnston dealing with the Battle of Peachtree Creek. All accounts agree that Johnston briefed Hood of the Battle plan and he offered his services before leaving for Macon.
Hood failed in keeping in contact with the Federal Army and so when it disappeared from it's front, Hood assumed that it was retreating an a grand ball was organized. It was a bit too late when the rail stations south of Atlanta were being put to torch. Hood sent Hardee and Lee's Corps to Jonesboro then ordered Gen. Hardee back to Atlanta. Hardee refused the order because he knew the bulk of the Federal Army was outside of Jonesboro and requested re-enforcements. In fact about 60,000 Federals were involved in the attack. In the end, Hood marched out of Atlanta and used Hardee for a rearguard. Hardee's Corp held their positions until nightfall when they were overrun.
What happened at Spring Hill was almost funny if Franklin hadn't been so deadly. There is a lot of speculation on the events but facts are Hood was not in conditions to be in command and Cheatham appeared to have taken a leave of absence with a lady and whiskey.
The Federal Army simply marched right passed Gen. Bates Division under the cover of darkness. The Confederates mistaking them for their own troops. They were so close that some hapless Federals wandered into the Confederate campfire area and were captured, yet neither side were fully aware the proximity of each other. Gen. Schofield was aware of his situation was fortunate not to risk battle in an effort to get back to Franklin. In the end Hood ordered the bulk of Cheatham's men into battle to near certain death at Franklin.
Bentonville and Lee's surrender made it clear that the war was over. President Davis left it up to General Johnston to decide whether or not to continue on with the conflict. The Army of Tennessee received it's last pay day with Silver Mexican Pecos from the Treasury and then prepared for surrender. Gen. Oates had already been surrendered by this time. He was in no position to make judgements on the Army of Tennessee. There was no intention to slight President Davis. In fact the President gave his blessing to surrender the Army.
The more I hear about Oates the more I begin to question his character. Perhaps if he had paid more mind to the Army of Northern Virginia, the war would have ended in a Confederate victory!
Doubt it, but remember, most of his views appear to opinionated. He definitely had strong opinion about the Army of Tennessee. I am wondering why?
Will
Should have mentioned!
The statement on conflicting personalities is correct but in all aspects of the War, not just the AOT. Examples: McClennan vs. Scott, McClennan vs Lincoln, Lincoln vs a majority of people, Lee vs several of his senior Generals, Davis vs Gov.Brown, Stephens vs Davis. Hood vs a majority of people.
Over the past few years people have been trying to determine what made the AOT so different from the ANV. If you really look at the whole picture, Sherman's Army was equally different from the Army of the Potomac. I can't remember the Author but someone had stated simply that the Army of N.Virginia was simply a better Army. HOGWASH!
Simply a different Army with a different set of circumstances.
Will
I still believe that Colonel
I still believe that Colonel Oates was factual with most accounts. Because he was very close friends with different generals including Hood, Perry, and Gordon, he was able to after the war gather good sources. I am only able to believe most of what Oates wrote because of what I read from other officers and men who wrote of what happened and most accounts seem to go in the same direction. As for his opinions, I think that is what makes his book such entertaining reading. Most of the memoirs I have read including General Early, Grant, and General Sorrel I've been bored half way to a comma. Oates' included the flair that attracts many people to Southern history. The flair of an old cavalier and passionate devotion to a cause. The same great reading can also be found in General Gordon's, Major Van Borke's memoirs, and Company Atch.
As for Hardee, I believe he was too old school. Most of his attacks were slow and half hearted. He had much in common with Longstreet. His opinions of a battle plan or commander usually dictated how he would perform.
I must agree with you about Davis though. He too often appointed commanders who were loyal to him rather than superb on the field. Some examples include General Polk, Bragg, and Hood. And those were not the best decisions. It was not until General Lee became General in Chief of all the Confederate armies that Johnston was reappointed as you pointed out. Davis also seemed more fitting to be an army comander rather than a president. While constantly looming over the armies and their tactics, he neglected much of the responsibilites of heading a new country.
I have many opinions on who the best commander of the Army of Tennessee should have been as I'm sure everyone does.
I also agree that Hood made mistakes. His decision to not continue Johnston's late summer defense plan of Atlanta sped up the process of the citie's capture. His biggest mistake, I believe was not defending Georgia against Sherman. While Hood advanced into Tennessee, Sherman caused the deep South to cave in.
Thanks for the interesting information.
"Genuis sees before hand what should be done and common place sees it when it is too late.' 'The difference between genius and common place. The first depends on himself and the latter trusts others."-William C Oates
I have an humorous account
I have an humorous account that I would like to share from The War between the Union and the Confederacy. The following is an account of the battle of Altoona on October the 4th.
"Corse (US) had about 2,000 men. About 1:30, in the last assault, Corse was wounded in the face.
Sherman viewed the scene and heard the roar of the artillery from a mountain many miles away. At last the signal officer obtained correspondence with the fort and inquired the result. Corse replied to Aide -de-camp Dayton: 'I am short a cheekbone and an ear, but am able to whip all hell yet...'
General Corse, being a Democrat, was by President Cleveland appointed Postmaster of Boston. The writer met him, but never discovered the absence of either a cheekbone or an ear. If he whipped hell he bears no marks of combat on his person."-Colonel William Oates
"Genuis sees before hand what should be done and common place sees it when it is too late.' 'The difference between genius and common place. The first depends on himself and the latter trusts others."-William C Oates